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INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal decentralisation is considered as an important policy instrument to achieve 
economic efficiency and ensure effective governance through financial autonomy of 
provincial governments. It integrates the smaller units of federation and ensures their 
participation in the economic development of country while at the same time capacitate 
the central government to fulfil the national level tasks more efficiently and effectively. It 
is considered as an important growth accelerating measure. It empowers the lower level 
governments through financial autonomy and administrative empowerment.  
Devolution helps the lower tiers of government to act as a powerful administrative 
agent of the central government. However, decentralisation helps units to be more 
innovative, responsible and efficient as they have more autonomous status. 
Decentralisation policy is believed to positively affect economic growth because it 
envisage better derivation and implementation of social policies. The decentralised setup 
of the government does not have any information barriers and lower level of government 
is better positioned to know the basic necessities and developmental needs of the people 
that are living in different regions of a country. Decentralisation brings up the true 
potential of a locality with the efficient resource exploration and its efficient utilisation. It 
furthers competition among the competing constituencies for better service provision 
which results in higher efficiency. This all has the potential to positively influence 
economic growth.  
Fiscal decentralisation can help in better targeting and can eliminate 
unnecessary engagements of the central governments. In the words of Bird and Smart 
(2002), ―for services to be effectively provided, those receiving transfers need a clear 
mandate, adequate resources and sufficient flexibility to make decisions‖. 
Decentralisation is the process through which the responsibilities as well as resources 
from national to sub national
12
governments are devolved [Rondinelli (1981)]. Thus, 
by decentralisation, central government empower the sub national governments in 
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such a manner that can help in better use of resources, improve public living 
standards and at the same time to share the work load [Gordin (2004)]. Nevertheless 
from financial point of view, decentralisation may pose danger if it is weakly 
designed so that provinces are able to externalise their costs to others [Rodden, et al. 
(2002); Von Hagen, et al. (2000)]. 
Pakistan is federal country with a centralised taxation system. Federal government 
collects bulk of resources and then redistributes it among the federal and constituent parts 
to correct both vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. In Pakistan, the system of fiscal 
resource distribution is guarded by law and an autonomous body i.e., National Finance 
Commission (NFC) is constituted by law, after every five years time, to ensure 
transparent and judicious resource distribution. However, at times different problems 
interrupted the mechanism and current fiscal resource distribution did not prove up to the 
mark. Deadlocks were experienced at times and hence NFC failed to deliver undisputed 
awards to settle vertical and horizontal resource gaps. 
The Present study aims to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
fiscal resource distribution system in Pakistan, through the compilation of its historical 
trends. Proper information regarding the prevailing resource distribution system is 
believed to result in better policy formulation and thus would ultimately help the country 
to catch the development path faster. In this connection, it is also necessary to analyse the 
effects of current resource distribution policies on the economic growth of the country. 
Thus, this study helps in identifying the degree of financial autonomy of the sub national 
governments and quantify its long run returns.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Importance of the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth is depicted by the amount of literature available on this topic. Extensive material 
is found exploring various important relationships. However, differing results were 
obtained at the estimation stage owing to the variables and data under analysis. Similarly, 
different results are found for the developed and developing economies. Even in the case 
of Pakistan, studies still has to find clear relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth.  
Davoodi and Zou (1998) developed a theoretical model for explaining the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. For empirical testing, 
they have used time averaged panel data for 46 countries from 1970 to 1989. In the case 
of developing countries a negative association is found between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic growth.  
Zhang and Zou (1998) used the China‘s provincial panel data for year 1978–92 
and found that there is a negative relationship between the degree of fiscal 
decentralisation and provincial economic growth.  
Phillips and Woller (1997) studied the relationship between economic growth and 
fiscal decentralisation for the sample of seventeen developed countries and twenty three 
less developed countries for the period from 1974 to 1991. For the developed countries 
they found weakly significant, negative relationship between revenue decentralisation 
and economic growth. However, they fail to prove any relationship between the two 
variables in the case of less developed countries.  
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Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found a highly insignificant relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth for the United States. Authors attributed it to 
the fact that the country has already achieved an optimal level of fiscal decentralisation 
and thus further decentralisation may be detrimental to economic growth.  
Thieben (2001) used the OECD countries cross sectional data for the period from 
1975-95. He analysed the benefits and short comings of fiscal decentralisation for these 
countries. The study could not found any relationship between economic growth of the 
OECD countries and the degree of revenue decentralisation of the sub-national 
governments.  
Contrary to the above stated review, Lin and Liu (2000) concluded that fiscal 
decentralisation has made positive effects on provincial economic growth in the case of 
China. They used the provincial panel data of twenty eight provinces of China for the 
period from 1970 to 1993. The authors observed that fiscal reforms played an important 
role in the impressive growth of China.  
Another interesting observation was made by Mello and Barenstein (2001) which 
used the cross country data for 78 countries for 1980-92. The study concluded that as the 
share of non-tax revenues, grants and federal transfer increases in the total sub-national 
revenues, the association between decentralisation and governance becomes stronger.  
 
Resource Distribution System in Pakistan   
Pakistan has a federal system. It is a country with strong federal government. 
Currently there are three levels of government working in Pakistan i.e., the federal, 
provincial and the local (district) level governments. Due to the efficiency and 
distributional issues, the resource sharing mechanism always remained under debate. 
According to Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006), the systematic resource transfers take 
place at four stages. At the first stage the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards 
decides the revenue distribution between the federal and provincial governments. At the 
second stage, Provincial Finance Commission (PFC) delegate resources from provincial 
to local levels. Following this as a third stage transfers are made from federal to local 
levels and finally the vertical resource sharing occurs at local levels i.e. from District 
Government to Tehsil Municipal Administration. On the contrary, the random transfers 
take the shape of special grants, discretionary funds for executives, the parliamentarian 
development funds and likewise. However, in this study our emphasis will remain on the 
fiscal relations between federal and provincial government.  
Without sufficient knowledge regarding the history of resource distribution, it is 
hard to identify related bottlenecks related to resource distribution mechanism. This 
section summarises all the awards presented during the course of time after 
independence. The over time development is then discussed on the basis of historical 
analysis [Ahmed, et al. (2007)].  
 
Niemeyer Award 
Under the 1935 Act of United India, the Niemeyer Award was being followed for 
resource distribution between the centre and provinces. According to this award, an 
important tax i.e. sales tax was levied and collected by the provincial governments. In the 
case of income tax, 50 percent of the total collection was reallocated to the provinces. 
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After 1947, when Pakistan came into being, the same arrangements were followed till 
March 1952, although some adjustments were made in railway budget and sharing of 
income and sales tax [Pakistan (1991)].  
 
Raisman Award  
The Raisman award was presented in December, 1947 [Pakistan (1991)]. The 
Raisman award made special arrangements to cover the poor financial position of the 
federal government. Fifty percent of sales tax was allocated to the federal government as 
an ad hoc measure. Provinces were allocated 50 percent of income tax, out of which 45 
percent was allocated to East Pakistan while the rest was divided among the provinces of 
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Bhawalpur, Khairpur, Balochistan states union and 
residual
23
as 27, 12, 8, 4, 0.6, 0.6, and 2.8 percent, respectively [Pakistan (1991)].  
 
Revenue Sharing Under One Unit 
During the implementation period of Raisman award, in year 1955, all the four 
provinces of West Pakistan were merged and declared one unit. Hence, after 1955 the 
whole country was declared two identities only i.e., East Pakistan and West Pakistan. 
During the era of One Unit, two awards were announced i.e., of year 1961 and 1965.  
 
National Finance Committee 1970 
In April 1970, for the first time a committee (instead of a commission) was 
designated to work under the federal finance minister and give recommendations for 
amicable Intergovernmental resource allocation. The resource pool was reshuffled. The 
committee recommended that vertical resource distribution between federal and 
provincial governments should be 20:80 percent, respectively. Once again, 30 percent of 
the allotted sales tax was redistributed among the provinces according to the collection 
from the respective areas. 
 
Financial Arrangements in 1973 Constitution 
In 1973, the new constitution of Pakistan was agreed upon by the National 
Assembly and implemented. In the new constitution, special arrangements were made to 
make the resource distribution mechanism smooth and acceptable. According to the 1973 
constitution, it was obligated upon the federal government to constitute the NFC after 
each five years time. The finance commission was designated to suggest and review the 
resource distribution mechanism in Pakistan. Hence with the new statutes, an effort was 
made to ensure an amicable resource distribution.  
 
The 1st NFC Award 1974  
The first NFC was established under the new constitution in 1974. Under this 
commission the DP consisted of only sales tax, income tax and export duty on cotton. 
Population was adopted as only criterion for horizontal resource distribution among the 
provinces. The vertical resource distribution remained as of the previous award. With the 
 
2The states which were believed to join Pakistan later after independence. 
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adoption of population as the single criterion for resource distribution, the provincial 
share of Punjab increased to 60.25 percent of the total provincial share. Thus with the non 
diversification of formula, the smaller provinces were affected negatively.  
 
The 2nd NFC Award 1979 
Following the 1974 award, the 2nd NFC award was set up by the government of 
President General Zia-ul-Haq, in 1979. Hence the revised resource shares for the 
provinces announced under the 1979 NFC award are presented at Table 1.   
 
Table 1 
Provincial Share 1979 Award 
(Percent) 
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan 
57.97 23.34 13.39 5.30 
Source: Pakistan (2006b). 
 
The 3rd NFC Award 1985 
This NFC remained unable to recommend any improvement in distribution 
mechanism. The resources continued to be distributed in the light of the 1974 NFC award 
with the amended provincial population.   
 
The 4th NFC Award 1991 
The fourth NFC award was formed in 1990 by the democratic government of Mr 
Nawaz Sharif. The commission finalised its recommendations in April, 1991. This award 
was considered an important achievement because it achieved success after a gap of 
almost 16 years. This award came up with a number of positive recommendations. Most 
importantly the resource pool was expanded with the inclusion of more taxes in the DP. 
Thus, according to the 1991 NFC award, the horizontal resource share of the provinces 
registered a growth of 17 percentage points (i.e., increase from 28 percent to 45 percent 
of federal tax revenues), [Ghaus and Pasha (1994)]. The resources were allocated among 
the provinces in accordance with their population size, which is presented at Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Provincial Share-1991 Award 
(Percent) 
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan 
57.88 23.28 13.54 5.30 
Source: Pakistan (1991). 
 
The 5th NFC Award 1997 
This NFC award was announced in second month of 1997. The DP was further 
expanded with the inclusion of all taxes and duties. It now comprised of sales tax, income 
tax, wealth tax, capital value tax, custom duties, export duties, excise duties (other than 
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duty on gas that is charged at wellhead), and all other taxes that were levied or collected 
by federal government at that time. Similarly, royalties on crude oil and net development 
surcharges on natural gas were extended to the provinces in the shape of straight 
transfers. In addition, this commission also announced the incentive of matching   
grants
34
to the provinces [Pakistan (1997)].  
 
The 6th NFC Award 2000 
Despite having problems at the implementation stage, the two NFC awards of 
1991 and 1997 remained successful in bringing improvements in the resource distribution 
mechanism. The 6th NFC for year 2000 was constituted by General Pervaiz Musharraf, 
the then President of Pakistan. The centre was insisting 45 percent out of DP but the 
provinces were demanding 50 percent of share. It completed its tenure without any 
success. 
 
The 7th NFC Award 2006 
After the unproductive ending of the 6th NFC, new commission was nominated on 
21st July, 2005. Nevertheless, the deadlock still prevailed among the stake holders. The 
commission faced difficulties in achieving consensus for amicable resource distribution 
mechanism. Therefore, as a last option, under the Article 160(6) of the 1973 constitution 
of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, all the chief ministers of the provinces vested the 
authority to the President for declaring an acceptable and justified fiscal resource sharing 
formula. Hence, the President General Pervaiz Musharraf amended the ―Distribution of 
Revenues and Grants-in-Aid Order, 1997‖ by issuing Ordinance No. 1 of 2006. Thus 
finally after a delay of six years, the resource distribution mechanism of 1997 was 
amended on 1st July, 2006 [Pakistan (2006a)]. Considering the provinces demands, the 
provincial share was increased against the federal and they were given gradual increase in 
their shares.  
In Short, History of NFC indicates that the resource distribution in Pakistan by and 
large has been unsuccessful. It has both the shades of failure as well as certain 
achievements. On its positive achievements, NFC has a best system to ensure amicable 
resource distribution as it takes all the decision makers on board and decides over 
resource distribution with their consent. In addition, with the passage of time more 
financial autonomy was delegated to the provinces and there is more realisation of fiscal 
decentralisation especially in past two NFC awards of 1997 and 2006. Onwards from 
1991 NFC award, resource allocation for the provinces increased either due to inclusion 
of taxes in the DP or due to the higher provincial share against that of federal. In addition, 
increased grants and straight transfers are channelised to the provinces now. Similarly, 
the incentive of matching grants motivated the provinces, inviting them to enhance 
efficiency, have their own resource generation and obtain financial autonomy [Ahmed, et 
al. (2007)]. 
However, on its negative side, NFC has experienced various deadlocks too, mainly 
due to the non agreement among the provinces. In a political economy like Pakistan, all 
the provinces have differing characteristics and offers different economic opportunities to 
 
3Provided that they exceed the target of 14.2 percent growth in revenue generation. 
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its people. Varying interests of the provinces weakened their bargaining power. Over the 
time, provinces have demanded for inclusion of different criteria in the resource 
distribution formula. For example, Sindh has emphasised on the revenue generation 
criteria, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa demanded for backwardness, Balochistan advocated for 
area while Punjab insisted for taking the agriculture produce as a criteria to be considered 
while distributing the resources. Thus due to the failure in bargain and absence of 
consensus, provinces retreat to the adoption of a single criterion, which is sub optimal. 
The institutional set up of NFC has failed in amicably progressing and tackling the 
problem of fiscal decentralisation. Lack of consensus had given way to interim awards 
and grants which ultimately has benefited the larger province. 
 
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
 
Methodology 
For this study, the theoretical model of Davoodi and Zou (1998) is followed. It is the 
most explicit and well elaborated model encompassing the influence of fiscal 
decentralisation upon economic growth. Authors have extended the endogenous growth 
model of Barro (1990) which states that production function has two inputs i.e. capital and 
public spending. Keeping in view the Pakistan‘s situation,45 it is assumed that over the time, 
public spending is done by the two tiers of government i.e., federal and provincial. Thus, 
appropriation of spending among the different levels of government can lead to higher 
economic growth (even without changing the existing budget‘s share in GDP) if the 
prevailing spending pattern is different from the growth maximising expenditure shares.  
In the context of this study, we will follow the above model to determine the 
effects of FD on economic growth and final regression equation can be written as: 
ttttt ControlDFDPCGDP  2210  
where ‗t‘ refers to time, PCGDPt represents the growth rate of per capita gross domestic 
product. FDt is the set of proxies that would represent different aspects of decentralisation. 
Different FD variables would be separately used in the regression as alternative measures of 
fiscal decentralisation. Dt is the dummy variable representing years with political instability. 
There were certain events that presumably affected the economic outcomes in Pakistan and 
by introducing the dummy for politically volatile years we want to control their effects. 
Lastly, as we know that literature has identified a number of important variables that affect 
economic outcome of the country and are therefore included in the regression. Hence, 
Controlt variables including investment, government expenditures and trade openness are 
taken into account to get reliable results.
56
  
 
Data 
As discussed earlier, the major focus of the study is to test the empirical relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth for Pakistan. For this purpose, study 
 
4Even after LGO, 2001, ninety six percent of public spending is carried out by the two tiers of 
government which are federal and provincial. 
5We tried but could not get significant results for labour force variable therefore is not discussed here.  
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would use time series data for 36 years covering the period from year 1974-2009. Although, 
the length of the data is quite narrow for the time series analysis, nevertheless, there are solid 
reasons which restrict the availability of meaningful data for this study. To explain a bit, in 
1973 a new constitution was promulgated in Pakistan which explicitly elaborated the resource 
distribution mechanism in the country and following that data is available in legible form. 
Another reason is that prior to year 1973, Pakistan was struggling to recover from; adverse 
economic conditions due to the 1971 war, the end of eleven years of dictatorship and the 
separation of East Pakistan. Therefore, to have data for relative normal years, this study is 
restricted to start with data from year 1974 onwards.  
Now the important variables for the analysis are discussed. Before going into 
details, it is important to explain that as in this study we will be dealing with different 
important economic variables which might be a function of economic growth hence, to 
avoid the endogeneity issue we will express the explanatory variables as ratio to GDP. As 
we have GDP growth variable on the left hand side of the equation while the variable on 
the right hand side are expressed relative to level GDP thus explanatory variables are 
assumed to be exogenous. Per capita GDP growth (PCGDP) is used as the dependent 
variables to measure economic performance. PCGDP (at constant local currency unit) 
and has been taken from the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators (WDI).  
For the right hand side control variables, investment holds the most important 
position and is considered crucial for economic growth. This study uses ‗Total 
Investment‘ figures to capture investment behaviour in Pakistan and data is collected 
from various sources including SBP (2005), Pakistan (2009) and Budget speech 2009-10. 
In order to make it more intelligible and easy for explaining its relative position, Total 
Investment was expressed as a ratio to GDP (invtgdp).  
Government expenditure is considered as another important contributor to 
economic growth in developing countries. Developing countries often face problem of 
concentration of power at the centre and therefore, bulk of resources pours into the 
economy in the shape of government spending. Thus, government expenditure
67
was used 
and expressed as ratio to GDP (getgdp). Data source for this variable was WDI. Another 
important contributor to economic growth in this globalised world is trade openness. 
Measure for trade openness is defined as ‗exports plus imports‘ of goods & services and 
is expressed as a ratio to GDP (open). Hence, this variable would reflect the impact of 
trade openness on economic growth. Data for these variables was also taken from WDI.  
 
Fiscal Decentralisation Measures 
Having discussed the important determinants of economic growth, now we are in a 
position to discuss proxies for the variable of interest i.e. fiscal decentralisation. Data 
source for this variable was SBP (2005) and Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues) 
Decentralisation is a complex phenomenon and it covers a range of issues, from revenue 
raising capability, to the administrative capacity of the sub-national governments to take 
decisions as well as their spending responsibilities. Hence, it is very difficult to 
 
6General government final consumption expenditure includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on 
national defence and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government 
capital formation (WDI definition). 
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efficiently measure the exact degree of decentralisation. Nevertheless, literature on fiscal 
decentralisation has proposed a number of alternative measures which can be used to 
proxy the level of fiscal decentralisation in a country.  
Revenue approach for measuring fiscal decentralisation was used in this study. 
This approach was adopted in order to isolate the effects of two major sources of 
revenues for the provincial governments in Pakistan. These sources are the provincial 
own revenues and federal transfers (i.e. the provincial share in federal resource pool). 
Thus, analysis would make us able to figure out the individual effects of provincial 
resource generation potential and the effects of vertical fiscal imbalance (which illustrates 
provincial dependence on federal transfers) on economic growth.  
To capture the above stated aspects of fiscal decentralisation, proxies were tried in 
a number of ways so as to get a better measure for fiscal decentralisation. Due to the 
significant nature of the federal transfer in the provincial revenues, we will start 
discussing it first. Total federal transfers to provinces is presented in three different ways 
including real federal transfer
78
(rftrans), as a ratio to provincial total revenues (ftransttpr) 
and as a ratio to GDP (ftranstgdp). Thus, vertical fiscal imbalance captured in such a 
manner would provide us a chance to confirm its overall significance on economic 
growth of Pakistan by expressing it in absolute as well as in relative terms.  
Another important proxy to capture fiscal decentralisation is by looking at the provincial 
own revenues. The impact of provincial own resource base is used in a number of ways to 
enquire its contribution to economic growth of Pakistan. Presenting the total provincial revenues 
generated from own sources would be meaningless owing to its magnitude, therefore, provincial 
tax revenues are presented in ratio to federal tax revenues (ptaxtftaxr). This measure would show 
the impact of any increase in provincial tax revenues relative to federal and would help in 
enquiring its long run affect on the economic growth of Pakistan.  
 
Unit Root Test for Stationarity  
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is undertaken for all the variables using 
up to two lags
89
for each variable. The ADF test contains the short run dynamics and is 
based on the autoregressive models that contains the lagged differences of the same 
variable with the optional inclusion of both ‗constant‘ and ‗constant and trend‘ factors. 
Here the null hypothesis is that ―the variable contains a unit root i.e. it follows a non-
stationary process i.e. H0: –1 = 0‖ which is tested against an alternative hypothesis that 
―variable is stationary i.e. H1: –1 < 0‖. Hence, if the calculated value of the AFD test 
statistic is lower than the critical values, we accept the null hypothesis that there is a unit 
root and vice versa. The ADF results for the set of variables used in this study are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. It can be observed from the results that all variables (except 
three i.e. ratio of investment to GDP, ratio of government expenditure to GDP and ratio 
of provincial tax to federal tax revenues; which are stationary at level hence I(0)), are first 
difference stationary or I(1). Results remains consistent both with the inclusion of a 
‗constant‘ and a ‗constant and trend‘ factors in the ADF. Hence, it can be concluded from 
the results of the ADF test that data contains variables that are mix with respect to their 
order of integration. Therefore, the selection of appropriate econometric technique should 
be undertaken considering this property of the data.  
 
7Deflated using GDP deflator. 
8To allow for the correction of serial correlation, if any. 
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Table 3 
H0 : Non Stationary (At Level) 
Variables910 
 – ADF with Constant  – ADF with Constant and Trend 
Lags Lags 
0 1 2 0 1 2 
Pcgdp 1.445 1.600 1.714 1.065 1.498 1.879 
Invtgdp 3.723*** 2.572 2.506 3.508* 2.725 2.704 
Open 2.492 2.482 2.268 2.640 2.608 2.293 
Getgdp 2.954* 1.201 1.565 2.907 1.095 1.418 
Ptaxtftaxr 3.014** 4.746*** 5.128*** 2.537 4.180** 4.654*** 
Ftranstgdp 1.535 1.627 1.800 1.717 1.879 1.953 
Rftrans 1.372 1.376 1.526 1.464 1.725 1.804 
Ftransttpr 1.899 2.005 1.788 2.151 2.684 2.545 
Critical Values 
1%=***, 5%=**, 
10%=* 
3.633 
2.948 
2.612 
3.639 
2.951 
2.614 
3.646 
2.954 
2.616 
4.243 
3.544 
3.205 
4.253 
3.548 
3.207 
4.262 
3.553 
3.209 
 
Table 4 
H0: Non-stationary (At 1st Difference) 
Variables 
 – ADF with Constant 
Lags 
0 1 2 
Dpcgdp 4.442*** 2.747* 2.512 
Dinvtgdp 5.639*** 4.166*** 4.806*** 
Dopen 6.085*** 4.976*** 4.295*** 
Dgetgdp 10.52*** 3.900*** 2.890* 
Dptaxtftaxr 5.081*** 3.782*** 3.620** 
Dftranstgdp 5.212*** 3.777*** 2.571 
Drftrans 4.776*** 3.576*** 2.391 
Dftransttpr 4.657*** 3.912*** 2.823* 
Critical Values 
1%=***, 
5%=**, 10%=* 
3.633 
2.948 
2.612 
3.639 
2.951 
2.614 
3.646 
2.954 
2.616 
 
Econometric Technique 
There are number of econometric techniques which can be used to measure the 
relationship between economic variables. Adoption of different alternative techniques 
depends on the nature of data and the kind of relationship in which researchers are 
interested. In case of Pakistan, as National Finance Commission decides the resource 
transfer mechanism between federal and provincial governments by announcing NFC 
awards. These awards are constitutionally required to be announced after every five years 
(although some inconsistency is being faced from time to time). Therefore, it would be 
interesting to find out both the short term as well as the long run effects of fiscal 
 
9Variables expressed in lower case presents their log transformation. 
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decentralisation in Pakistan. This analysis will present the net effect of government‘s 
stance over fiscal federalism for its effect on economic growth. The appropriate 
econometric technique for estimating such kind of a relationship can rightly be pointed 
out as the ―Cointegration technique‖.  
To estimate cointegrating long run relationship among the variables, several 
methods are in practice and data properties often dictate their selection. Available 
techniques include the single equation residual based Engle and Granger (1987) 
technique, the maximum likelihood approach of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) by 
Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995), Johansen and Juselius (1990), the semi parametric 
approach by Phillips (1991) and quite recently, the ARDL approach is catching attention. 
Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin (1995) and Banerjee, et al. (1986, 1993, 1996) 
presented the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model where the short run and 
long run coefficient estimates are presented in an ARDL specification. The most 
noticeable improvement in the ARDL single equation approach is that it is the only 
cointegration technique that allows for the inclusion of I(0) and I(1) variables in the 
single equation estimation. ARDL cointegration technique yields comparatively better 
results in small sample. 
In our case, we have a small sample of 36 annual observations and data set contain 
variables that are integrated of different orders i.e. I(1) and I(0) thus, we will use the ARDL 
approach following Banerjee, et al. (1986, 1993). Describing the advantages of ARDL models 
that it encompass all the nested models, authors used the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) 
set up to suggest a test for cointegration. The test uses the lagged dependent variable as the 
error correction term to represent the existence of long run relationship. The unrestricted 
dynamic model presented by Banerjee, et al. can be written as:  
ttttt xyxy   11  
Where yt is the dependent variable while xt is the set of independent variables. In the 
above equation ―‖ represents the short run effects of changes in X on Y, while ―‖ are 
used to present long run coefficients for set of independent variables. Lastly, the 
coefficient of lagged dependent variable i.e., ―‖ indicates the error correction term and 
shows that with each passing period how much of the disequilibrium is adjusted.  ―‖ can 
also be explained as the rate at which model achieves equilibrium in the long run. The 
value of the error correction term lies between zero and two, where depending on 
significance ‗zero‘ means no long run relationship among the variables while value of 
‗one‘ suggest that disequilibrium is adjusted in the same period. However, any value 
between ‗one‘ and ‗two‘ would be exhibiting explosive roots.   
Table 5 present the results obtained by the General-to-specific (Gets) model 
selection procedure [Krolzig and Hendry (2001)]. According to Gets, analysis should 
start with the full model, then removing the insignificant variables and consulting the 
diagnostic checks till the final specification is reached where all the variables are 
significant. Gets approach in our case would benefit the analysis by eliminating the 
insignificant variables thus providing better degree of freedom for the rest of the 
variables to be estimated. Thus, applying the Gets approach to the ECM for the model 
discussed above has produced results as reported in Table 5. All the diagnostic tests are 
satisfied thus we can rely on the results that are produced.  
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Table 5 
Results 
Dependent Variable for the All the Models is ―DPCGDP‖ 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 2.221*** 2.069*** 2.931*** 
D.invtgdp 0.129** 0.121** 0.105** 
D.getgdp –0.043* –0.038*  
D.openbop –0.074* –0.071**  
D.ptaxtftaxr 0.049* 0.046**  
D.ftranstgdp 0.056**   
D.rftrans  0.060***  
D.ftransttpr   0.041* 
L.pcgdp –0.268*** –0.251*** –0.347*** 
L.invtgdp 0.163*** 0.152*** 0.119*** 
L.openbop   0.085** 
L.ptaxtftaxr –0.035** –0.034** –0.054*** 
L.ftransttpr   –0.027* 
dnps –0.013* –0.013** –0.013* 
Trend 0.005* 0.001*** 0.007*** 
    
N 35 35 35 
p 11 11 10 
R-sq 0.68465 0.71625 0.67997 
Radj^2     0.55326 0.59803 0.56476 
Chow(2006:1)     
F(  4, 24)     
0.3101     
(0.8678) 
0.2770   
(0.8894) 
0.6565   
(0.6289) 
Normality Test   
chi^2(  2) 
3.8020    
(0.1494) 
4.1224   
(0.1273) 
2.6036   
(0.2720) 
AR 1–4 Test    
F (4, 24)         
0.6714     
(0.6195) 
0.6435   
(0.6378) 
1.2651   
(0.3149) 
ARCH  1–4 Test    
F (4, 24)         
0.1777     
(0.9479) 
0.1892   
(0.9420) 
0.7977   
(0.5372) 
Hetero Test      
Chi^2( 12)      
24.1197   
(0.1916) 
25.6131   
(0.1413)  
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001, For Diagnostic tests, p-values in parenthesis.  
Results obtain using PcGets, by DF Hendry and H-M Krolzig, 1998-2005, version 1.18b. 
 
Results Interpretation 
Analysis has produced interesting results and it has proved the existence of long 
run relationship among the given set of variables. Results are interesting in the sense that 
they separate the short run effects from the long run influences of the variables. Three 
models, using different proxies for FD are presented here. Although, results are 
complicated but in line with facts related to the economy of Pakistan and is a true 
representation of the period under the analysis. The most important point to emphasis is 
that there exist a long run relationship between the fiscal decentralisation and economic 
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growth and it has pointed out the weaknesses of the FD mechanism in Pakistan. FD has 
long run contribution to the economic growth of Pakistan but it needs certain corrections 
for consistently positive results. The error correction term obtained from the lagged 
dependent variable has a significant coefficient ranging between 25–35 percent for 
different models. This shows that if there is any disequilibrium, one fourth of it would be 
adjusted with each passing year although the specific speed of adjustment depends on the 
variables under consideration in different models.  
First looking at the variable of interest, the ratio of ‗provincial tax revenue to 
federal tax revenue‘ has an interesting implication in the model. During the short run 
(where variables are expressed in differenced form), the ‗provincial tax to federal tax 
revenues‘ ratio has lead to a positive impact on the economic growth. Similarly the other 
indicator of provincial revenues representing FD i.e., ‗federal transfer to GDP‘, ‗real 
federal transfers‘ and ‗federal transfers as ratio to total provincial revenue‘ has also the 
same short run positive impact. Thus proxies of FD have produced almost the same 
results by posting a positive sign for coefficients in the short run.  
Short run analysis indicate that if there is an increase in provincial tax revenues 
with respect to federal tax revenues, it‘s immediate effect on the economy would be 
positive. Same is true for federal transfers which indicates that if provinces receive more 
funds to spend at local levels, it will positively affect economic growth in the short run.    
However, despite the fact that we got positive and significant short run results for 
FD variables but in the long run, the accumulated effect of FD overtime has negative 
implications for the economic growth of Pakistan. Long run relationship (denoted by 
lagged levels of variables) exhibit that only two proxies i.e., ratio of ‗provincial to federal 
tax revenue‘ and ratio of ‗federal transfers to total provincial revenue‘ have produced 
long run significant effects. Thus, factors that were measured with respect to provincial 
finances have turned significant in the long run. Nevertheless, both the proxies of FD 
have produced negative coefficients for the long run.  
These results are somewhat contradictory but one can think that they are in line 
with the economic situation in Pakistan. Provinces had negligible taxation powers which 
means that they always remained under-capacitated with respect to tax collection 
experience and at the same time they remained dependent on federal finances to fulfil 
their obligations. In these conditions if provinces are given higher taxation powers 
relative to federal government, this will incur efficiency losses because federal 
government is always considered more efficient in tax collection as compared to lower 
tiers of government. Higher taxation powers at the cost of federal government collections 
will result in long run losses to the economy and thus produced negative long run 
coefficient for ‗ptaxtftaxr‘ variable.  
On the other hand, although any increase in federal transfers to provinces will 
help provinces with more funds availability but these funds might have certain 
strings attached to it for its consumption. Federal transfers increases provincial 
finances but these does not necessarily goes to the sector prioritised according to 
local needs rather they might be spent to achieve overall national goals set by federal 
government. Hence, if increased spending is not in accordance with local needs, it 
cannot achieve the results that are expected from fiscal decentralisation. Excess 
dependence on federal transfers might undermine provincial autonomy which will 
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have negative effects according to the theories of FD. Federal transfers merely 
represent transfer payments to the provincial governments as they are already 
collected by the federal government therefore it will have no effect on the economic 
efficiency of the provinces. In Pakistan, as these transfers are being decided only on 
the basis of population only thus it fails to enhance the provincial capacity. 
Moreover, increased federal transfers may also result in higher consumption 
spending which will have positive impact on the economy in the short run but does 
not have same long run implications for the economic growth. Lastly, Positive effects 
from increased federal transfers to provinces in short run is out-balanced by the 
negative implications of reduction in federal revenues because an increase in federal 
transfers is a drain on federal government resources. Less resources at federal level 
retards long run economic growth. Pakistan has the lowest tax to GDP ratio 
(currently at 9  percent, while it hovered around 11 percent on average throughout 
the period of analysis in this study) and thus further reduction in federal resources 
will put constraints to finance mega projects that are necessary for long term 
economic growth.  
In addition, when the provincial government has more tax revenue in 
comparison with the federal government, it negatively affected economic growth. 
This indicates that provinces were inefficient in the realisation of efficiency gains 
from the revenue decentralisation due to their capacity issues. Thus in the long run, 
negative efficiency losses has dominated the positive welfare gains due to higher 
taxation powers of the local governments. On the other side, the fact remains that 
federal government had delegated only those taxes to the provinces which were not 
buoyant so it required more effort thus failed to have a long run positive effect on the 
economic growth in case of Pakistan.  
Thus, one can say that provinces were not better positioned to take advantage of 
increase in finances. This reflects that provinces do not possess such a decentralised 
system which can make them more responsible, innovative and productive. Lastly, the 
inconsistencies occurred with respect to FD in the country might also be responsible for 
the negative relationship. Thus, it is concluded that the FD mechanism adopted in 
Pakistan during the period has failed to produce optimum results. Poor provincial 
capacity to efficiently generate own resources as well as provincial dependence on 
federal transfers has negatively affected the long run economic growth of Pakistan. Thus, 
the uni-criterion resource distribution mechanism has fails to affect economic growth of 
Pakistan positively in the long run.   
For the other explanatory variables, investment has a positive impact both in the 
short run and long run in all the models. On the other hand, two other variables i.e., 
‗government expenditures at the national level‘ and ‗trade openness‘ have produced 
negative effects on the economic growth of Pakistan in the short run. As the government 
consumption spending includes the spending on defence and security for maintaining law 
and order, therefore instability in the country has often resulted in huge spending. This 
increased spending coupled with the political instability (which also has a negative 
coefficient, as expected) has produced the negative short term effects. ‗Trade openness‘ 
although has negative sign in the short run due to persistent huge trade deficits, it 
ultimately posted a positive impact in the long run when it becomes significant in the 3
rd
 
model.           
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study mainly discussed the fiscal resource distribution mechanism of 
Pakistan. Main objective of the study was to get acquainted with the fiscal 
decentralisation stance of Pakistan and its impact on economic growth of the country 
over the long run. In this connection, all the important concepts and systems that took 
place in Pakistan, were discussed at the start.  
The issue of resource distribution among federal and provincial governments never 
proved to be simple and is always considered a much complex issue. This study 
identified several issues in fiscal resource distribution mechanism of Pakistan. The most 
important issue was that the National Finance Commission adopts a single criterion 
(population) for resource redistribution among the constituent parts. There is a need to 
consider, evaluate and choose among a range of other indicators of development and 
fiscal needs. Among the important variables; infrastructure, poverty, backwardness, 
revenue generation capacity, efficiency aspects, inverse population density and likewise 
should be reviewed and most appropriate of these should be taken into account for 
solving the economic discrepancies of provinces through adequate resource transfer. 
A best working federal transfer system should take both the competitive as well as 
cooperative aspect of federalism. Although, these aspects are somewhat contrary to one 
another but to ensure balanced growth and considering welfare of the people, a balance 
should be brought between the two sides of federalism. A transfer system should be such 
that it can enhance economic efficiency and productivity through incentives as well as 
competition. Competitive federalism would take provinces towards innovation in revenue 
generation and better service provision through the increased competition among the 
federating units. Thus competitive federalism would induce higher economic growth that 
result from increased efficiency and would also help in achieving better governance.  
To sum up, key to successful public service delivery is adequacy, sufficiency, 
transparency and regular flow of funds to the stake holders. There should be an integration 
of other resource distributions tied to the development unit and all channels of resource 
flow to the provinces should be identified. Thus a bottom up approach is required which 
include all levels of formula, straight transfers and non-formula adhoc transfers. This should 
be accompanied with clearly identified aims and objectives of the financing and service 
delivery assignments; this will lead to an optimal level of growth and equity. Government 
had tried the devolution of power to local governments, which if accompanied with an 
adequate financial devolution would result in maximum economic returns. 
There should be more provincial autonomy and national cohesion that would result 
in better understanding of the needs of the federating units keeping the regional affiliation 
at the side. Financial autonomy will give more resources, more confidence and would 
also make the federating unit more accountable. Decentralised set up will reduce the 
dependence of the provinces on the centre and centre would be allowed to concentrate 
more on the national issues and only engage in the collection of those resources which 
can improve efficiency gains at the federal level. Thus the economic loss due to absence 
of capacity building mechanism in the provinces as well as engagement of the centre in 
the provincial matters would be resolved. Provinces should be encouraged and 
incentivised to generate their own resources instead of being dependent on federal 
government. 
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In the light of the given discussion, following recommendations can be suggested 
which would enhance the performance of the federation and result in higher economic 
growth: 
(1) Administrative decentralisation should be accompanied with the adequate 
fiscal decentralisation and capacitating the provinces with the delegation of 
appropriate financial autonomy. 
(2) Specialised and independent institutions should be developed to ensure smooth 
and judicious Intergovernmental resource distribution. 
(3) There should be a permanent body of NFC with a specialised secretariat and 
professionals of the subject as consultants.  
(4) The criteria used for addressing horizontal resource distribution should be 
broadened by incorporating criteria which can ensures efficiency.    
(5) Data availability and its quality should be improved to ensure better 
assessment of sub-national revenue potentials as well as to enhance 
transparency in resource flow.   
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